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STATEMENT OF AMICUS
Pursuant to FRAP 29(c), amicus states as follows:
The John Marshall Law School International Human Rights Clinic (“IHRC”)
is a student-practice legal clinic that seeks to promote human rights in the United
States and around the world. Students who work in the IHRC are supervised by
practicing attorneys who are faculty and staff at The John Marshall Law School.
The IHRC has a particular interest in this case in order to promote the international
human right to an effective judicial remedy.
All parties consented to the IHRC filing this amicus curiae brief.
No party’s counsel authored this brief in whole or in part. No party or
party’s counsel contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or
submitting this brief. No person—other than the amicus curiae, its members, or its
counsel—contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting this
brief.
This separate brief is necessary, because it contains arguments that are
different and distinct from the arguments in the Appellants’ brief and the briefs of
other amici.
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ARGUMENT
THE DISTRICT COURT’S RULING VIOLATES THE
APPELLANTS’ INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHT TO AN
EFFECTIVE JUDICIAL REMEDY AND SHOULD BE
REVERSED.
By dismissing the Appellants’ case as a political question, the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia violated international law. In particular,
the District Court violated the Appellants’ well-settled international human right to
a remedy. In order to comply with international law and to respect the Appellants’
international human right to a remedy, this Court should reverse the District
Court’s ruling, remand the case, and instruct the District Court to proceed to the
Appellants’ claims on the merits.
The right to a remedy for victims of violations of human rights is a bedrock
principle of international human rights law. It is protected by every major
international human rights instrument.1 It is universally recognized by international
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See, e.g., The Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 8, Dec. 10, 1948
(“Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals
for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by
law.”); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2(3), Dec. 16, 1966
(“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes [t]o ensure that any person
whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective
remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting
in an official capacity.”); the European Convention on Human Rights art. 13, Nov.
4, 1950 (“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are
violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding
that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity”);
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights arts. 7(1) and 26, Oct. 21, 1986
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and regional human rights tribunals.2 And it is an established principle of
customary international law.3
The international human right to a remedy includes a right to an appropriate
remedy.4 It includes a right to an effective remedy.5 It includes a right to a judicial
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  

(“Every individual shall have the right to have his cause heard,” and “State parties .
. . shall have the duty to guarantee the independence of the Courts and shall allow
the establishment and improvement of appropriate national institutions entrusted
with the promotion and protection of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the
present Charter”); American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man art.
XVIII, May 2, 1948 (“Every person may resort to the courts to ensure respect for
his legal rights. There should likewise be available to him a simple, brief procedure
whereby the courts will protect him from acts of authority that, to his prejudice,
violate any fundamental constitutional rights.”); American Convention on Human
Rights art. 25, Nov. 20, 1969 (“Everyone has the right to simple and prompt
recourse, or any other effective recourse, to a competent court or tribunal for
protection against acts that violate his fundamental rights recognized by the
constitution or laws of the state concerned or by this Convention, even though such
violation may have been committed by persons acting in the course of their official
duties.”); Arab Charter on Human Rights art. 23, May 22, 2004 (“Each State party
to the present Charter undertakes to ensure that any person whose rights or
freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy,
notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an
official capacity.”).
2
See, e.g., Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (Mar. 29, 2004); Cordova v. Italy (No. 1), App. No.
40877/98, 40 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. 974, 984 (2003); Velasquez Rodriguez v.
Honduras, Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 7, ¶ 25 (July
21, 1989).
3
United Nations General Assembly, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the
Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International
Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law,
G.A. Res. 60/147, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147 ¶ 1 (Dec. 16, 2005) (adopted by
consensus, including by the United States) (hereinafter “Basic Principles”).
4
See, e.g., Basic Principles ¶¶ 11 – 24 (stating that the right to a remedy
includes a right to access to justice; reparations, including restitution,
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or judicially enforced remedy.6 And it includes a right to a remedy against the
state, or the responsible individual, or both.7 Importantly, the right to a remedy is
absolute, categorical, and non-derogable.8
The international human right to a remedy includes several components: a
right to equal access to justice; a right to reparations, including restitution,
compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition; and a
right to relevant information about the underlying human rights violation.9 As most
relevant here, it includes “[a]n official declaration or a judicial decision restoring
the dignity, the reputation and the rights of the victim and of persons closely

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  

compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition; and
relevant information).
5
See, e.g., id. ¶ 11 (“Remedies . . . include . . . [a]dequate, effective and
prompt reparation for harm suffered.”)
6
See, e.g., id. ¶ 12 (“A victim . . . shall have equal access to an effective
judicial remedy . . . .”).
7
See, e.g., id. ¶ 15 (“In cases where a person, a legal person, or other entity is
found liable for reparation to a victim, such party should provide reparation to the
victim or compensate the State if the State has already provided reparation to the
victim.”).
8
See, e.g., Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 29, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 ¶ 14 (Aug. 31, 2001) (“Even if a State party, during a
state of emergency . . . may introduce adjustments to the practical functioning of its
procedures governing judicial or other remedies, the State party must comply with
the fundamental obligation . . . of the Covenant to provide a remedy that is
effective.”).
9
See, e.g., Basic Principles ¶¶ 11 – 24 (stating that the right to a remedy
includes a right to access to justice; reparations, including restitution,
compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition; and
relevant information).
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connected with the victim . . . .”10 In other words, it includes a judicial declaration
that a victim’s rights were violated.
The U.S. is specifically bound to honor the right to a remedy under the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (the “CAT”); the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(the “ICCPR”); and the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (the
“American Declaration”). The right applies through these instruments to the
actions of the U.S. government and its officers and agents in conducting the drone
strike that killed Salem and Waleed bin Ali Jaber—a violation of the right to life
and the right against extrajudicial killing under these instruments. This means that
the U.S. must provide an effective judicial remedy to the Appellants for the
claimed violation of international human rights law, including equal access to the
courts and a judicial declaration that Salem’s and Waleed’s human rights were
violated.11
Yet the United States District Court for the District of Columbia rejected the
Appellant’s claims and dismissed his complaint. Bin Ali Jaber v. U.S., 155 F.
Supp. 3d 70 (D.D.C. 2016). The court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction, because the
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
10

Id. ¶ 22(d) (emphasis added).
The Appellants sought only declaratory relief that the drone strike
constituted an extrajudicial killing in violation of customary international law, the
Alien Tort Statute, and the Torture Victim Protection Act. The international human
right to a remedy includes a right to this kind of judicial relief, a judicial
declaration that a victim’s human rights were violated. Id. ¶ 22(d).
11
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Appellants’ claims presented non-justiciable political questions. Id. at 77 – 81. In
so ruling, the District Court’s action thus left the Appellants entirely without a
remedy, in particular, those components of the right to a remedy that require equal
access to justice and a judicial declaration that a victim’s rights were violated.
This Court should reverse the District Court and instruct the court to proceed
to the merits pursuant to its obligations under well-settled international human
rights law. In this way, and only this way, this Court can ensure that the District
Court complies with the international human right to a remedy.

I.

The District Court Must Provide a Judicial Remedy for Victims of Torture
Under International Human Rights Law.
The District Court, as an arm of the U.S. government, is obliged to comply

with the international human right to a remedy for violations of human rights law.
Here, the Appellants have alleged that the U.S. and its agents violated international
human rights law by authorizing and executing the unlawful extrajudicial killing of
Salem and Waleed bin Ali Jaber in violation of customary international law and the
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991. The underlying rights are also protected by
the right to life and the right against torture, among other rights, in the CAT, the
ICCPR, and the American Declaration.
Because these instruments protect the underlying rights of the Appellants,
they also protect the Appellants’ right to an effective judicial remedy, including a
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right to equal access to justice and a right to a judicial declaration that their
underlying rights have been violated.
A.

The CAT Requires the United States to Provide a Judicial Remedy for
Victims of Extra-Judicial Killings.

The CAT, which the U.S. ratified on October 21, 1994, categorically bans
torture, including the extra-judicial killing of innocents by drone strike. It also
requires the U.S. to provide an effective judicial remedy for victims of torture.
1.

The CAT Bans the Extra-Judicial Killing of Innocents by Drone
Strike.

The CAT categorically bans “any act by which severe pain or suffering,
whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes
as . . . punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected
of having committed . . . .” CAT art. 1(1).
This ban applies wherever U.S. officials act. By its plain terms, the CAT
requires the United States to ban torture categorically in any location under its
jurisdiction. Article 2 of the CAT provides:
1.
Each State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative,
judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory
under its jurisdiction.
2.
No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of
war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public
emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.
CAT art. 2, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. Moreover, “States parties are
obligated to adopt effective measures to prevent public authorities and other
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persons acting in an official capacity from directly committing, instigating,
inciting, encouraging, acquiescing in or otherwise participating or being complicit
in acts of torture as defined by this Convention. . . . .” Id. ¶ 17.
The U.S. acknowledged the sweep of the CAT in its most recent periodic
report to the CAT Committee. In its report, the U.S. stated that “Under U.S. law,
officials of all government agencies are prohibited from engaging in torture, at all
times, and in all places, not only in territory under U.S. jurisdiction.” Committee
against Torture, United States of America Periodic Report, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/USA/3-5 ¶ 13 (Dec. 4, 2013). See also id. ¶¶ 36, 39, 105. The CAT
Committee validated this acknowledgment by “welcom[ing] the State party’s
unequivocal commitment to abide by the universal prohibition of torture and illtreatment everywhere, including Bagram and Guantanamo Bay detention facilities,
as well as the assurances that the United States personnel are legally prohibited
under international and domestic law from engaging in torture or cruel, inhuman,
or degrading treatment or punishment at all times and in all places.” Committee
against Torture, Concluding observations on the combined third to fifth periodic
reports of the United States of America, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/3-5 ¶ 10
(Dec. 19, 2014).
The CAT’s ban on torture applies to the U.S. government’s drone-killing of
Salem and Waleed bin Ali Jaber. The killing inflicted “severe pain and suffering”
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for the purpose of punishment. CAT art. 2. Moreover, the killing was committed
by U.S. government officials acting in their official capacities, thus falling within
the CAT’s jurisdictional sweep. Committee against Torture, United Sates of
America Periodic Report, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/3-5 ¶ 13 (Dec. 4, 2013). See
also id. ¶¶ 36, 39, 105.
Because the CAT’s categorical ban on torture applies to the U.S.
government’s drone killing, so too does the CAT’s right to an effective judicial
remedy.12
2.

The CAT Includes an Effective Right to a Judicial Remedy for
Victims of Torture.

The plain language of the CAT requires the U.S. to provide an effective
judicial remedy for victims. This includes an obligation to enact legislation that
provides a victim with an effective remedy, including full restitution and
compensation, enforceable through the courts. And when legislation proves
ineffective at providing a remedy, the U.S. nevertheless must provide an effective
judicial remedy for victims of torture.
Article 14 of the CAT provides:
Each State Party shall ensure in its legal system that the victim of an
act of torture obtains redress and has an enforceable right to fair and
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The Appellants also pleaded that the Torture Victim Protection Act was
implemented pursuant to the U.S. government’s obligations under the CAT. This
pleading alone is enough to trigger the CAT’s right to a remedy.
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adequate compensation, including the means for as full rehabilitation
as possible. . . .
CAT art. 14 (emphasis added). The CAT Committee clarified the scope of Article
14 in its General Comment 3:
[R]edress includes the following five forms of reparation: restitution,
compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of nonrepetition. The Committee recognizes the elements of full redress
under international law and practice as outlined in the Basic Principles
and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims
of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law . . . . Reparation must
be adequate, effective and comprehensive.
Committee against Torture, General Comment No. 3, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/GC/3 ¶ 6
(Dec. 13, 2012). “Satisfaction” includes exactly the kind of judicial declaratory
relief that the Appellants seek here: “an official declaration or judicial decision
restoring the dignity, the reputation and the rights of the victim and of persons
closely connected with the victim . . . .” Id. ¶ 16.
In order to comply with Article 14, state parties have an obligation to enact
domestic legislation to enforce and to provide an effective remedy to victims of
torture. Id. ¶ 20. Moreover, state parties must provide for the enforcement of this
domestic legislation through the courts. Id. (“Such legislation must allow for
individuals to exercise this right and ensure their access to a judicial remedy.”).
When domestic legislation fails to provide an effective remedy, the CAT
requires state parties to provide an effective remedy through the judiciary. Indeed,
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the CAT Committee specifically identified “inadequate national legislation” as an
obstacle to the full realization of the right to an effective remedy:
States parties to the Convention have an obligation to ensure that the
right to redress is effective. Specific obstacles that impede the
enjoyment of the right to redress and prevent effective implementation
of article 14 include, but are not limited to: inadequate national
legislation . . . state secrecy laws, evidential burdens and procedural
requirements that interfere with the determination of the right to
redress; statutes of limitations, amnesties and immunities . . . .
Id. ¶ 38. See also id. ¶ 32 (“States parties shall ensure that access to justice and to
mechanisms for seeking and obtaining redress are readily available and that
positive measures ensure that redress is equally accessible to all persons regardless
of . . . reason for which the person is detained, including persons accused of
political offences or terrorist acts . . . .”). In other words, a victim’s right to an
effective remedy exists with or without national legislation; and when national
legislation is ineffective, the CAT nevertheless requires the courts to provide a
remedy.
The CAT Committee specifically recognized that the obligations under
Article 14 applied to U.S. torture overseas. Thus, for example, the CAT Committee
urged the United States to “[p]rovide effective remedies and redress to victims,
including fair and adequate compensation, and as full rehabilitation as possible, in
accordance with the Committee’s general comment No. 3 (2012) on the
implementation of article 14 of the Convention by State parties.” Committee
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against Torture, Concluding observations on the combined third to fifth periodic
reports of the United States of America, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/3-5 ¶ 12(c)
(Dec. 19, 2014). It also wrote that “[t]he State party should ensure that all victims
of torture are able to access a remedy and obtain redress, wherever acts of torture
have occurred, and regardless of the nationality of the perpetrator or the victim.”
Id. ¶ 15. Finally, the CAT Committee wrote,
The Committee urges the State party to take immediate legal and
other measures to ensure that all victims of torture and ill-treatment
obtain redress and have an enforceable right to fair and adequate
compensation . . . in particular . . . terror suspects claiming abuse . . . .
Id. ¶ 29.
In conclusion, the CAT requires the U.S. to provide an effective judicial
remedy for victims, including prompt, fair, and adequate compensation for acts,
like extrajudicial killings, that violate the CAT. This means that the U.S. must
enact legislation that provides a victim with an effective remedy, including equal
access to the courts and a judicial declaration that the victim’s rights have been
violated. But if that legislation proves ineffective, the U.S. nevertheless must
provide an effective judicial remedy for victims.
B.

The ICCPR Requires the U.S. to Provide an Effective Judicial
Remedy for Victims of a Violation of the Right to Life.

The ICCPR, which the U.S. ratified on June 8, 1992, categorically protects
the right to life. ICCPR art. 6. And like the CAT, it also requires the U.S. to
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provide an effective judicial remedy for violations, if legislative and administrative
remedies do not exist.
1.

The ICCPR Bans the Arbitrary Deprivation of Life by Drone
Strikes.

Article 6(1) of the ICCPR says that “[e]very human being has the inherent
right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his life.” ICCPR Art. 6(1). The right to life is categorical and nonderogable. ICCPR Art. 2.
The right to life and other provisions of the ICCPR apply “to anyone within
the power or effective control” of a state party, “even if not situated within the
territory of the State Party.” Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 ¶ 10 (Mar. 29, 2004). “This principle also
applies to those within the power or effective control of the forces of a State Party
acting outside its territory, regardless of the circumstances in which such power or
effective control was obtained . . . .” Id. See also Burgos/Delia Saldias de Lopez v.
Uruguay, Communication No. 52/1979, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 at 88 (July 29,
1981), (“[I]t would be unconscionable to so interpret the responsibility under
article 2 of the Covenant as to permit a State party to perpetrate violations of the
Covenant on the territory of another State, which violations it could not perpetrate
on its own territory.”); Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences on the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 43 International
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Legal Materials 1009 (Int’l Ct. of Justice July 9, 2004) (endorsing the
extraterritorial application of the ICCPR).13
The right to life protects individuals against arbitrary deprivation of life by
drone strikes. Thus, in its observations on the most recent periodic report of the
United States, the Committee expressed concern “about the State party’s practice
of targeted killings in extraterritorial counter-terrorism operations using unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAV), also known as “drones,” the lack of transparency regarding
the criteria for drone strikes, including the legal justification for specific attacks,
and the lack of accountability for the loss of life resulting from such attacks.”
Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report
of the United States of America, CCPR/C/USA/CO/4 ¶ 9 (April 23, 2014).
[T]he Committee remains concerned about the State party’s very
broad approach to the definition and geographical scope of “armed
conflict,” including the end of hostilities, the unclear interpretation of
what constitutes an “imminent threat,” who is a combatant or a
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The U.S. skirted this conclusion when it wrote in its Fourth Periodic
Report that it was “mindful” that the Human Rights Committee, the ICJ, and other
state parties all opine that the ICCPR applies extra-territorially. Human Rights
Committee, Fourth period report, United States of America, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/USA/4 ¶ 505 (May 22, 2012). In response, the Committee recommended
that the U.S. should “[i]nterpret the Covenant in good faith, in accordance with the
ordinary meaning . . . including subsequent practice, and in light of the object and
purpose of the Covenant, and review its legal position so as to acknowledge the
extraterritorial application of the Covenant under certain circumstances, as
outlined, inter alia, in the Committee’s general comment No. 31 . . . .” Human
Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the four periodic report of the
United States of America, CCPR/C/USA/CO/4 ¶ 4(a) (April 23, 2014).

	
  

13

civilian taking direct part in hostilities, the unclear position on the
nexus that should exist between any particular use of lethal force and
any specific theatre of hostilities, as well as the precautionary
measures taken to avoid civilian casualties in practice . . . .”
Id. The Committee wrote that the U.S. should “[e]nsure that any use of armed
drones complies fully with its obligations under article 6 of the Covenant” and
“take all feasible measures to ensure the protection of civilians in specific drone
attacks and to track and assess civilian casualties, as well as all necessary
precautionary measures in order to avoid such casualties . . . .” Id.
Because the ICCPR’s provision protecting the right to life applies to the
U.S. government’s drone killing, so too does the ICCPR’s provision requiring a
right to an effective judicial remedy.
2.

The ICCPR Includes an Effective Right to a Judicial Remedy
for Victims.

In order to enforce the protection of the right to life and other rights, the
ICCPR provides a right to an effective remedy for victims of torture. Article 2(3)
of the ICCPR states:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein
recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy,
notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons
acting in an official capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his
right thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or
legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided
for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of
judicial remedy;
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(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such
remedies when granted.
ICCPR art. 2(3) (emphasis added). This means that a state party must provide a
victim with an “accessible, effective, and enforceable” remedy, Human Rights
Committee Communication No. 2018/2010, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/112/D/2018/2012
¶¶ 11.3, 11.6, 13 (Jan. 25, 2015), which includes “reparation to individuals whose
Covenant rights have been violated.” Human Rights Committee, General Comment
No. 31, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13 ¶ 16 (May 26, 2004). “Reparation” includes
“rehabilitation and measures of satisfaction, such as public apologies, public
memorials, guarantees of non-repetition and changes in relevant laws and practice,
as well as bringing to justice the perpetrators of human rights violations.” Id.
If the “administrative or legislative authorities,” or any other authority of the
state, does not or cannot provide a remedy, then it falls upon the judiciary to do so.
See id. ¶ 4 (stating that the obligations under the ICCPR “are binding on every
State Party as a whole,” and that “[a]ll branches of government (executive,
legislative and judicial), and other public or governmental authorities, at whatever
level—national, regional or local—are in a position to engage the responsibility of
the State Party”). The rights in the ICCPR “can be effectively assured by the
judiciary in many different ways, including direct applicability of the [ICCPR],
application of comparable constitutional or other provisions of law, or the
interpretive effect of the [ICCPR] in the application of national law.” Id. ¶ 15. But
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“[w]itout reparation to individuals whose Covenant rights have been violated, the
obligation to provide an effective remedy . . . is not discharged.” Id. ¶ 16. In
particular, domestic law, including domestic constitutional law, cannot “justify a
failure to perform or to give effect to obligations under the [ICCPR],” id. ¶ 4, and it
cannot absolve officials of responsibility for violations. Id. ¶ 18 (stating that “the
States Parties concerned may not relieve perpetrators from personal responsibility,
as has occurred with certain amnesties . . . and prior legal immunities and
indemnities” and that “no official status justifies persons who may be accused of
responsibility for such violations being held immune from legal responsibility.”).
The Human Rights Committee has been clear that the ICCPR’s right to a
remedy applies to victims of U.S. government drone strikes. Thus, the Committee
wrote that the U.S. government should “[p]rovide victims [of drone strikes] or their
families with an effective remedy where there has been a violation, including
adequate compensation, and establish accountability mechanisms for victims of
allegedly unlawful drone attacks who are not compensated by their home
governments.” Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations on the fourth
periodic report of the United States of America, CCPR/C/USA/CO/4 ¶ 9 (April 23,
2014). At the same time, the Committee also expressed concern about barriers to
the full realization of the right to a remedy, especially barriers related to
constitutional privileges that would shield the government from accountability in
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the courts and immunities that would shield individual officials from liability.
Thus, the Committee expressed concern “about the inability of torture victims to
claim compensation from the State party and its officials due to the application of
broad doctrines of legal privileges and immunity.” Id. ¶ 12. The Committee
concluded that “[t]he State party should ensure the availability of compensation to
victims of torture.” Id.
In conclusion, Article 2(3) requires the U.S. to provide an effective judicial
remedy when it deprives a victim of his or her right to life under Article 6. If a
legislative remedy does not exist or is unavailable, the courts have an obligation to
provide a remedy.
C.

The American Declaration Requires the U.S. to Provide an Effective
Judicial Remedy for Victims of a Violation of the Right to Life.

Like the ICCPR, the American Declaration protects the right to life and
requires the U.S. to provide an effective judicial remedy for victims.
The U.S. has been a member of the Organization of American States since
1951, when it deposited the instrument of ratification of the OAS Charter. The U.S.
is therefore subject to the obligations in the American Declaration. See
Interpretation of the Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man within the
Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory
Opinion OC-10/89, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 35-45 (ser. A) No. 10 (July 14, 1989)
(“According to the well-established and long-standing jurisprudence and practice
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of the inter-American system, however, the American Declaration is recognized as
constituting a source of legal obligation for OAS member states, including in
particular those States that are not parties to the American Convention on Human
Rights.”). See also Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) v. U.S., Case 12.626, Inter-Am.
Comm’n H.R. Report No. 80/11 ¶¶ 115 and 117 (July 21, 2011).
The Declaration protects the right to life, and it provides for a right to an
effective judicial remedy for violations of the right to life.
1.

The American Declaration Bans the Arbitrary Deprivation of
Life by Drone Strikes.

The American Declaration states that “[e]very human being has the right to
life, liberty and the security of his person.” Am. Decl. art. I. Because the American
Declaration contains no territorial or jurisdictional limitation, this right to life
applies, by its plain terms, to every action by the U.S. government, wherever it
occurs, to a person “subject to its authority and control.” Coard v. U.S., Case
10.951, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 109/99, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106 doc. 6
rev. (1999).
Because a victim of a U.S. government drone strike is under the
government’s “authority and control,” the American Declaration’s right to life
applies to victims of U.S. government drone strikes. And because the American
Declaration’s right to life applies, so, too, does its right to a remedy.
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2.

The American Declaration Includes an Effective Right to a
Judicial Remedy for Victims.

Like the CAT and the ICCPR, the American Declaration provides a right to
an effective judicial remedy for victims. Article XVIII of the American
Declaration reads:
Every person may resort to the courts to ensure respect for his legal
rights. There should likewise be available to him a simple, brief
procedure whereby the courts will protect him from acts of authority
that, to his prejudice, violate any fundamental constitutional rights.
Am. Decl. art. XVIII. This right is similar in scope to the right in Article 25 of the
American Convention on Human Rights. Am. Con. art. 25. See also Jessica
Lenahan (Gonzales) v. U.S., Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. Report No.
80/11 ¶¶ 171 and 172 (July 21, 2011).
This right includes “the right of every individual to go to a tribunal
when his or her rights have been violated; to obtain a judicial investigation
conducted by a competent, impartial and independent tribunal that
establishes whether or not a violation has taken place; and the
corresponding right to obtain reparations for the harm suffered.” Id. ¶ 172
(emphasis added). See also Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Reparations,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 7, ¶ 25 (July 21, 1989) (“[E]very
violation of an international obligation which results in harm creates a duty
to make adequate reparation.”); Raquel Marti de Mejia v. Peru, Case 10.970,
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Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 5/96, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.91, doc. 7 ¶ 157
(March 1, 1996) (The right to a remedy “must be understood as the right of
every individual to go to a tribunal when any of his rights have been violated
(whether a right protected by the Convention, the constitution or the
domestic laws of the State concerned), to obtain a judicial investigation
conducted by a competent, impartial and independent tribunal that will
establish whether or not a violation has taken place and will set, when
appropriate, adequate compensation”).
The right to a remedy must be “available and effective,” which means,
among other things, that the U.S. must hold the responsible individuals to account.
Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) v. U.S., Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. Report
No. 80/11 ¶ 173 (July 21, 2011). The remedy must also be “suitable,” that is,
appropriate to the violation. Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, ¶ 64 (July 29, 1988) (“Adequate domestic
remedies are those which are suitable to address an infringement of a legal right. A
number of remedies exist in the legal system of every country, but not all are
applicable in every circumstance.”). “[T]he absence of an effective remedy to
violations of the rights recognized by the Convention is itself a violation of the
Convention by the State Party in which the remedy is lacking.” Judicial
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Guarantees in States of Emergency, Advisory Opinion OC-9/87, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) No. 9, ¶ 24 (Oct. 6, 1987).
Thus, the U.S. government has an obligation under the American
Declaration to provide an effective judicial remedy to a victim of a drone
strike, in particular, a right “to go to a tribunal when his or her rights have
been violated” and a right to “a judicial investigation conducted by a
competent, impartial and independent tribunal that establishes whether or
not a violation has taken place . . . .” Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) v. U.S.,
Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. Report No. 80/11 ¶ 172 (July 21,
2011).
*

*

*

The U.S. has a legal obligation under the CAT, the ICCPR, and the
American Declaration to provide an effective judicial remedy to a victim of a
drone strike. This obligation is categorical and non-derogable. It means that a
victim must have equal access to the courts and a right to a judicial declaration that
his or her rights have been violated. The remedy may be a creation of the
legislative, executive, or judicial branch, but if the legislature and executive fail to
provide an effective remedy, the judiciary must provide one. In any event, whether
the remedy is legislative, executive, or judicial, the remedy must be enforceable
through the courts.
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This right to an effective judicial remedy under the CAT, the ICCPR, and
the American Declaration applies with full force to Salem and Waleed bin Ali
Jaber. The Appellants therefore have a right to an effective judicial remedy for
Salem’s and Waleed’s deaths by drone strike, and the District Court’s action
dismissing his case violated that right.

II.

The District Court Violated the Appellant’s Right to an Effective Judicial
Remedy.
Despite the Appellants’ right to an effective judicial remedy, the District

Court failed to account for this right and flatly dismissed his case. Bin Ali Jaber v.
U.S., 155 F. Supp. 3d 70 (D.D.C. 2016). In particular, the District Court ruled that
it lacked jurisdiction over the Appellants’ claims, because the claims raised
nonjusticiable political questions. Id. at 77 – 81. But by failing even to consider the
Appellants’ right to an effective judicial remedy (much less to grant it), the District
Court violated the Appellants’ right to a remedy under binding international law.
In Carranza v. Argentina, the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights unequivocally rejected the government’s argument that a political question
excuses the government’s responsibility to provide an effective judicial remedy.
Report No. 30/97, Case 10.087, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98 (Int.-Am. Comm. H.R. April
13, 1998). In that case, an Argentine judge challenged his dismissal from office in
the domestic courts. The courts ruled that they lacked jurisdiction to hear the case,
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because they “were not competent to rule on the fairness, wisdom or efficacy of the
measures ordering the removal of magistrates . . . as these were eminently political
acts of a de facto government.” Id. ¶ 3. When the plaintiff brought his case to the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, arguing (among other things) that
the courts’ denial of jurisdiction violated his right to a remedy, the government
countered that there was no violation, because the political question doctrine, as
developed and applied in the United States, barred the domestic courts from
hearing the case. Id. ¶¶ 44 – 59.
The Commission concluded that the government violated the plaintiff’s right
to a remedy, because the case did not raise a political question, and the domestic
courts declined jurisdiction in error. Id. ¶ 59. But the Commission went on to say
that the government’s position (that the domestic courts’ denial of jurisdiction
based on the political question doctrine did not violate the plaintiff’s right to a
remedy) “made it impossible for the petitioner to have an effective judicial remedy
that would protect him against alleged violations of his right . . . .” Id. ¶ 72. “If
there is no legal jurisdiction and if it is not appropriate to decide, then there can be
no protection. Consequently there is no effective legal remedy under the terms of
Article 25 of the American Convention.” Id. ¶ 75. The Commission concluded that
Argentina, through its domestic courts’ application of the political question
doctrine, violated the petitioner’s right to an effective judicial remedy. Id. ¶ 83.
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In other cases involving similar restrictions on access to domestic courts,
international tribunals have similarly concluded that those restrictions violated a
victim’s right to an effective judicial remedy. See, e.g., Barrios-Altos v. Peru,
Inter-Am. Ct. of H.R. ¶ 41 – 44 (March 14, 2001) (concluding that “all amnesty
provisions, provisions on prescription and the establishment of measures designed
to eliminate responsibility are inadmissible, because they are intended to prevent
the investigation and punishment of those responsible for serious human rights
violations,” and thus violate a victim’s “right to judicial protection embodied in
Article 25”).14
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International tribunals have also concluded that restrictions on access to
justice for reasons related to national security violate the victim’s right to an
effective judicial remedy. In a series of cases, authorities in Algeria, during a
period of significant domestic unrest and under a state of emergency, detained,
tortured, and disappeared individuals who they believed belonged to terrorist
groups that posed a threat to the state. In the aftermath, the Algerian legislature
enacted an ordinance (supposedly to implement the Charter for Peace and National
Reconciliation) that foreclosed any judicial action against members of the Algerian
defense and security services arising out of this treatment. The Human Rights
Committee repeatedly concluded that the ordinance violated the victims’ right to a
remedy under Article 2(3) of the ICCPR. See, e.g., Human Rights Committee,
Communication No. 1884/2009 ¶ 7.14 (Nov. 27, 2013); Human Rights Committee,
Communication No. 1899/2009 ¶ 9 (June 5, 2014); Human Rights Committee,
Communication No. 1931/2010 ¶ 8.11 (Aug. 22, 2014). Cf. Committee Against
Torture, Communication No. 514/2012 ¶ 8.6 (Jan. 13, 2015) (finding a violation
of the right to a remedy under Article 14 of the CAT, where state authorities
“fail[ed] to conduct a thorough, prompt and impartial investigation” of the victim’s
complaint that he had been tortured by the state’s intelligence service).
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These cases lead to an inescapable result: Just as the Argentine courts’
application of the political question doctrine violated the petitioner’s right to a
remedy in Carranza, and just as the Peruvian immunity violated the petitioner’s
right to a remedy in Barrios-Altos, the District Court’s ruling applying the political
question doctrine violated the Appellants’ right to an effective judicial remedy
here.
But even if this Court adopts a less categorical approach to the right to an
effective judicial remedy, we come to the same result. For example, in Cordova v.
Italy, the Court applied a “proportionality” test when the government raised a
constitutional defense against the petitioner’s claim of a right to an effective
judicial remedy. Application No. 40877/98 (Jan. 30, 2003). In Cordova, the
petitioner, Cordova, a prosecutor, sued a former Italian President, Cossiga, for
defamation. Id. ¶ 12. An Italian District Court dismissed the case, ruling that
Cossiga, as a Senator for life under the Constitution, enjoyed Parliamentary
immunity under the Constitution. Id. ¶¶ 17 – 18. The public prosecutor declined to
appeal, Id. ¶ 20, and Cordova took the case to the European Court.
The European Court ruled that Italian constitutional Parliamentary immunity
violated Cordova’s right to an effective judicial remedy. The Court held that a
limitation (like constitutional Parliamentary immunity) on access to a court must
be proportional to a legitimate “aim sought to be achieved.” Id. ¶ 54. The Court
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concluded that immunity in this case was not proportionate, because Cossiga’s
communications were not connected with his Parliamentary functions and the
purpose of Parliamentary immunity. Id. ¶ 62. Therefore, the Italian District Court’s
ruling dismissing the case violated Cordova’s right to access the courts. Id. ¶ 66.
The Court explained why even a domestic constitutional limitation on access can
violate the fundamental international right to access the courts:
It would be incompatible with the purpose and object of the
Convention, however, if the Contracting States, by adopting a
particular system of parliamentary immunity, were thereby absolved
from their responsibility under the Convention in relation to
parliamentary activity.
Id. ¶ 58.
Under the “proportionality” approach, just as the limitation on access in
Cordova (constitutional Parliamentary immunity) resulted in a violation of the
right to access to the courts, the limitation on access here (the political question
doctrine) results in a violation of the right to an effective judicial remedy. For one
thing, the District Court mis-applied the political question doctrine, as explained by
the Appellants and other amici. For another, even if the District Court properly
applied the political question doctrine, that doctrine does not rise to the same
constitutional level of importance as the text-based Parliamentary immunity in
Cordova. And for yet another, the underlying rights in this case—the right to life
and the right against extrajudicial killing—far outweigh the underlying right to
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reputation in Cordova. In short, the limitation on access in this case is far less
proportional to any legitimate aim even than the limitation on access in Cordova.
Under the proportionality approach, the District Court’s application of the political
question doctrine violated the Appellants’ right to an effective judicial remedy.
Under either approach—the categorical approach that says that any
application of the political question doctrine violates the right to an effective
judicial remedy, or the “proportionality” approach that looks to the relationship
between the limitation on access and the aim of that limitation—the District
Court’s ruling dismissing the Appellants’ case based on the political question
doctrine violates the Appellants’ right to an effective judicial remedy.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the District Court ruling violated the Appellants’
right to an effective judicial remedy, under well-settled international law. Amicus
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the District Court’s ruling and remand
the case, with instructions to consider the Appellants’ case on the merits.
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